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While in the past youth looked for jobs in the private sector or at foreign companies, they now look for government jobs as they offer more security, says Arthur Kroeber, leading economist and author of China’s Economy: What Everyone Needs to Know®. Most graduates feel the sluggish Chinese economy will continue for some time, he says on CNBC.
China has started to push capital into its sluggish economy, but economists have different opinions on what the government wants to achieve. According to Arthur Kroeber, author of China’s Economy: What Everyone Needs to Know®, its financial measures are more about stabilizing its economy, not about a full-blown stimulus as it did in the past, he says at the ChinaFile.
Arthur Kroeber:
China’s economic support measures are better described as stabilization than stimulus. Unlike in previous full-bore stimulus programs, for instance in 2008 and 2015, the aim today is not to engineer a boom but simply to halt the deterioration in economic conditions evident in the past few months, and stabilize growth at around the target of 5 percent.
China’s long-term economic strategy has not changed. Xi Jinping’s intent, as outlined in the Third Plenum decision this past July, is to shift capital from real estate and infrastructure into technology-intensive manufacturing. The aspiration is that the productivity gains from high-tech industries will deliver the long-run growth that China needs, offsetting the impact of a declining population and other negative factors. Another key goal of this strategy is to ensure that China becomes self-sufficient in core technologies, enabling it to withstand the pressure of U.S. containment policies. The leadership is fully prepared to tolerate a period of relatively sluggish growth as the price of making this structural shift.
But the stabilization policies of the last month show the limits of this tolerance. They also reflect a judgment that the contraction of the property sector, now into its fourth year, has gone far enough, and that policy should shift from restrictive to modestly supportive. The final policy move, expected in early November—issuance of long-term central government debt to swap for provincial debt—is a long-overdue recognition that the financial position of heavily indebted provinces is unsustainable, and that direct fiscal support from Beijing is needed.
Over the next year or so, the economic package is likely to succeed in its limited aims: reversing the decline in housing sales, and providing local governments with relief from interest payments so they can pay back wages to their employees and overdue bills to the companies that supply them with goods and services. This should be enough to stabilize GDP growth at somewhere close to the 5 percent target. The benefits to the rest of the world, however, will be modest. Neither consumer spending nor commodity demand will enjoy a dramatic pickup. And Beijing’s steady commitment to its investment-first growth strategy means that other countries will still face the challenge of intense competition from low-priced Chinese imports.
Despite the hope of the international financial community, China is not heading for structural reforms, says leading economist Arthur Kroeber, author of China’s Economy: What Everyone Needs to Know®, to CNBC. Pushing up demand is not high on the agenda for China’s leadership, he says, and they do not want to push up debts levels to new heights.
One expert suggested that investors are misunderstanding China’s intent in providing the stimulus boosts. According to Arthur Kroeber, founding partner of Gavekal Dragonomics, Beijing’s intent isn’t to accelerate the economy by enabling consumers, but simply to stabilize it.
“The economic aims are to stabilize growth and prevent deflation from tightening its grip,” he wrote in the Financial Times. “The market goal is to restore enough confidence so that equity prices post steady, moderate rises. This will reopen the window for new listings and enable the stock market to resume its assigned role of financing China’s industrial policy ambitions.”
China’s electric car makers are doing pretty well, certainly domestically and – perhaps except the US – also internationally, says leading economist Arthur Kroeber, author of China’s Economy: What Everyone Needs to Know. Excess capacity seems mainly a problem for traditional car makers, as demand for EV vehicles is only picking up. Internationally EV makers might face some restrictions, but they seem able to manage those, Kroeber adds in a debate organised by the Asia Society.
Whether the world is heading for a recession does not depend on the state of China’s economy, but on demand in de US, says China economist Arthur Kroeber at the CNBC. In the eyes of Xi Jinping, China is not doing as bad as some economists say it does, he adds.
China’s economy is dealing with some tough years, writes leading economist Arthur Kroeber, author of China’s Economy: What Everyone Needs to Know®, in ChinaFile, especially now that it does not have enough tools with debts and the property crisis like it did in the past. “So we need to brace for the consequences of the Xi model: slower growth in China, a big rise in Chinese technology exports, and more protectionism in the rest of the world,” he writes.
Arthur Kroeber:
China’s economic malaise results from a combination of political decisions, structural factors, and policy mistakes. The central reason for it is that Xi Jinping has decided to make national security and technological upgrading—not economic growth—his policy priorities.
The broadening definition of national security, and the increased influence of security interests in economic policy, have soured private investor confidence. The focus on technological upgrading has led to an economic strategy that relies almost exclusively on industrial policy. This means that the government devotes most of its attention to the supply side of the economy: boosting production of semiconductors, clean energy equipment, electric vehicles, industrial machinery, ships, and other products seen as needed to increase the country’s technological capability and self-sufficiency. Virtually no serious effort goes into figuring out how to unlock domestic demand—especially from households, which now save about a third of their income, one of the highest savings rates in the world.
These policies mean that China’s economy will have two faces in the coming years. The chronic shortage of demand will mean disappointing GDP growth—probably 3-4 percent on average over the rest of the decade—and a constant struggle to shake off deflation. But at the same time, its technology-intensive sectors will thrive, thanks to both government support and China’s uniquely competitive manufacturing ecosystem. The result will be persistent high trade surpluses and, probably, a strong wave of protectionism from countries that want to preserve their own industrial capacity.
This policy stance also makes it very hard for China to solve two of its biggest structural problems: the collapsing property market and the huge and growing debt burdens of local governments. The last time China faced a challenge of this scale was the late 1990s, when nearly half of all bank loans went bad. At that time, it responded with a combination of financial engineering to postpone the reckoning of bad debts, well-targeted infrastructure stimulus, and aggressive deregulation of manufacturing and housing which unlocked huge new sources of entrepreneurship and household demand. As a result, China grew out of its problems and by 2010 became the world’s second-biggest economy.
A similar approach today would recognize that deregulation of services—which account for more than half the economy, and all net new employment—is the main path to boosting consumer demand and accelerating economic growth. Too much of the service economy is either in state hands, or burdened by stunting regulations. But such a policy would conflict directly with Xi’s desire to keep the state’s finger on all economic levers. So we need to brace for the consequences of the Xi model: slower growth in China, a big rise in Chinese technology exports, and more protectionism in the rest of the world.
Rating agencies have been lowering China’s rating. Renowned economist Arthur Kroeber, author of China’s Economy: What Everyone Needs to Know®, does not see an acute financial problem for the country, but costs for financing its debts will constrain its economic growth, not only for the quarters to come but for the next few years, he tells CNBC.
China has entered a new era, where the communist party has changed its contract with the people, says economist Arthur Kroeber, according to Bloomberg. The new iteration? It’s called values-based legitimacy.
Bloomberg:
China’s recent economic performance and policymaking have prompted a slew of economists—Bloomberg’s included—to lower their estimates of the country’s trend growth rate for coming years. But don’t count on this to undermine the Chinese Communist Party’s grip.For decades, the CCP encouraged the idea that its legitimacy flowed in large part from stoking rapid growth. Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese leader famous for his “reform and opening up” mantra, declared that development is the “hard principle” driving policy. Year after year, China’s leaders have touted GDP figures showing how the party was delivering on this mandate.
Go back further than Deng and you’ll find a different contract between Beijing and its people. Mao Zedong’s initial version was ensuring the common people won the “class struggle” against land-owners and businesspeople (in part through mass killings).
These days, Xi is writing up another contract, says Arthur Kroeber, a China economist and founding partner at Gavekal Dragonomics. In a recent lecture, he said “there’s a fairly extensive propaganda effort going on to shift away from that old social contract,” in part to avert mass criticism of a slowdown in Chinese growth.
The new iteration? It’s called values-based legitimacy.
What are the components of this new contract? They include culture, history, nationalism and an anti-corruption drive aimed at easing concerns about rising inequality.
Arthur Kroeber discusses recent economic schools on China
Leading economist Arthur Kroeber discusses China’s economic state and looks at the gloomy predictions from other economists. We do not have enough post-COVID-19 data to draw firm conclusions, he argues and goes on to take down three schools of gloom in current economic thinking about China’s future, at the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies.
The Chinese state is extending its grip on previously private investments in different areas like housing, health care, and education, similar to its crackdown on tech sectors in the past, says leading economist Arthur Kroeber to Reuters. Investors now prefer to turn to those industries, as they have the state as a backup.
Reuters:
China’s recent sweep of the medical sector came as a shock to many investors who had thought the end of Beijing’s three-year regulatory purge of the property and tech sectors meant there would be no more industry-wide crackdowns as policymakers prioritised economic recovery.
Several government bodies in July launched a year-long anti-corruption campaign into the medical system, making clear that China’s drive to deliver affordable housing, education and healthcare to its masses was more important.
That forced many investors to quickly draw parallels with last year’s crusade against private tutoring and a long-running one against tycoon Jack Ma’s consumer finance firm Ant Group.
The one unanimous conclusion they came to was that Beijing wants a greater state presence in these sectors.
“The underlying principle is that healthcare is kind of like a social service that should principally be in state hands,” said Arthur Kroeber, partner and head of research at Gavekal in New York. Kroeber says the crackdowns are about “defining what the state does, what the private sector does, and creating a more limited sandbox for the private sector to play in.”
“This links to the idea of common prosperity because it’s the state’s job to guarantee a level of provision of basic services, whether it’s education or healthcare, so it’s important for the state to have a role,” he said.
That has left investors now picking the state over the private sector.
Economist Arthur Kroeber is not expecting a significant stimulus of China’s economy as the central government has done in the past. The government is instead hoping the economy will outgrow the current post-Covid-19 dip without massive intervention, he says at CNBC.
The geopolitical arguments between China and the USA are developing fast. Renowned economist Arthur Kroeber takes the stock right now as US treasury secretary Yellen visits Beijing, for the NPR. How can two major economies disentangle if they rely so much on each other?
NPR:
SCHMITZ: It’s been four years since a U.S. treasury secretary visited Beijing. And in that time, relations between the U.S. and China have worsened considerably. For years, these two economies really needed each other. To what extent is that still the case?
KROEBER: I think that’s still enormously the case. You know, all-time – trade is at an all-time high, over $700 billion. You have a lot of U.S. companies that still rely on China as one of their major markets, both for volume and for growth. So there’s definitely been some chipping away in certain areas, notably semiconductors. But the level of interdependence is still extremely high.
SCHMITZ: And, you know, the U.S. has been trying to disentangle itself from China more recently, you know, reshoring supply chains, placing controls on semiconductor technology, as you mentioned, you know, keeping Trump era tariffs on Chinese goods in place. I’m curious, how do you think this has shaped how China interacts with the rest of the world?
KROEBER: Well, I think the Chinese have come to the conclusion that it is the purpose of U.S. policy not just to reduce its reliance on China but to slow down China’s growth and its technological development. So it’s made China a lot more suspicious than it already was of U.S. intentions. So it’s created that problem. It’s also encouraged the Chinese to ramp up the charm offensive to international companies both from the U.S. and from Europe, and in other areas because they want to continue large inflows of foreign investment and looking for companies to act as a counterweight against political pressure that’s coming not only from Washington but also from Europe as well.
SCHMITZ: You know, to what degree does reduced dependence between these two superpowers increase the risk of greater hostilities or even conflict between the two?
KROEBER: Well, if we really get to a point where the economies are significantly less dependent on each other, I think that is a problem. And if you look at two simple examples from the last two decades – we’ve had an extraordinary period of peace over Taiwan, which is kind of disputed territory. And one of the reasons for that is because the high level of economic interdependence between China and the U.S. and Taiwan means that the costs of China trying to solve that issue by military means are extremely high.
I think you can also see that in the Russia-Ukraine situation, that China has an alignment with Russia. They would probably like to do more to help them in the current situation. But they’ve been very, very cautious about staying away from exporting weapons to Russia, again, because of the costs, because of their high interdependence. So I don’t think we’re at a low interdependence level yet.
Many observers have been pessimistic about China’s recent leadership changes and the centralization under Xi Jinping. Still, renowned economist Arthur Kroeber sees a significant upside, at least for the short term. Also, what is Xi Jinping’s vision for the country’s economic development?
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Rating agencies have been lowering China’s rating. 
