Jim Rogers |
Jim Rogers is a speaker at the China Speakers Bureau. Do you need him at your meeting or conference? Do get in touch or fill in our speakers' request form.
Are you looking for more stories by Jim Rogers on China? Do check out this list.
Weblog with daily updates of the news on a frugal, fair and beautiful China, from the perspective of internet entrepreneur, new media advisor and president of the China Speakers Bureau Fons Tuinstra
Jim Rogers |
Kaiser Kuo |
The Civil War that followed not long after the Japanese surrender in August 1945 was arguably touch-and-go for the CCP as well, and depended very much on the dispositions of external powers, most notably Stalin’s Soviet Union and the U.S. It’s too much to go into here, but it was by no means a foregone conclusion that the CCP would emerge victorious in that fight.
Believe it or not, the Cultural Revolution also nearly brought on the collapse of the Party. People don’t remember it this way, necessarily; they conjure up images of throngs of identically-dressed Red Guards in Tiananmen all holding aloft Mao’s Little Red Book and imagine that this was the Party in absolute ascendancy. It was Mao who was in the ascendant — not the Party. Mao Zedong had turned the forces of his zealous young revolutionaries against the Party itself, and against any manifestation of its institutional authority, whether in the bureaucracy, in industry, in educational institutes, in hospitals, or even in the villages. It was actually a grim time for the Party — not its day in the sun.
More predictions in SupChina.Finally, there was of course 1989. It’s hard to say just how close the Party might have come to “collapse” in May and June of 1989. But it’s clear that there were deep schisms within the Party leadership about how to respond to the student-led protests of that year. And individual decisions made by individual unit commanders in the 38th and 27th Armies appear, sent in to quell the “turmoil” eventually, appear to have made the difference between the “successful” quashing of the student and, by mid-May, also working-class demonstrators, on the one hand; and what just might have been civil war.
Ian Johnson |
In 1975, he was released from Qincheng but sent back to his mountain exile. It was only after Mao died and Deng Xiaoping took power at the end of 1978 that Mr. Li was given back party membership. He returned to Beijing to rejoin the Ministry of Water Resources. He again opposed plans to build the Three Gorges Dam, teaming up with the journalist and environmental activist Dai Qing to prevent the gargantuan project.
He later was transferred to the party’s influential Organization Department, where he helped oversee the recruitment of new officials. But his career ended abruptly in 1984 when he refused to give special preference to the offspring of senior officials.
“Between choosing telling the truth or a promising career future, he always chose the truth,” Ms. Dai said in an interview. “He has been true all his life.”
That began the most influential stage of his life: elder statesman with a conscience.He lost the battle over the Three Gorges Dam, which hard-liners pushed through in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen massacre and the defeat of reformers in the Communist Party.
But he wrote a highly influential book about the Lushan meeting, “The Veritable Records of the Lushan Conference,” which countered the party’s story that the famine was not Mao’s responsibility. He also wrote essays, articles and open letters to senior leaders calling for more transparency and tolerance.
Perhaps most importantly, he became the patron saint of “Yanhuang Chunqiu,” or “China Through the Ages,” an edgy journal that took on sensitive historic issues, such as the Great Leap Famine or the Cultural Revolution, that the Communist Party wanted forgotten.
“He was idealistic,” said Wu Si, its editor until 2016. “He didn’t work for political gain.”But Mr. Li’s vision of a more open and democratic China faded. By 2016, Mr. Wu was fired as head of the magazine and it was taken over by hard-liners.
“I’m afraid there was nothing that Li Rui could do,” Mr. Wu said. “It was beyond the ability of one person to protect.”
Mr. Li refused to back down, however, writing critically about President Xi Jinping, China’s most authoritarian leader since Mao. In an essay, he contrasted Mr. Xi with his late father, Xi Zhongxun, who had been known for his tolerance and opposition to strongman rule.
Mr. Li wrote that around 2006 he went to Zhejiang Province, where Mr. Xi was then serving as party secretary. Mr. Xi took him out to dinner and Mr. Li urged him to speak out against abuses in the system. According to Mr. Li, China’s future leader rebuffed him:
“How can I emulate you? You can hover on the fringes” — the implication being that the ambitious Mr. Xi wanted to be at the center of power.
Mr. Li added a damning comment to the story: “In the West there is a saying that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”
For the Chinese historian Zhang Lifan, Mr. Li epitomized the tragedy of a generation. Many initially saw the Communist Party as China’s salvation, watched as it turned into a dictatorial force under Mao’s nearly 30 years at the top, and then yearned that the reform era would finally bring changes — only to see these hopes dashed by the party’s inability to renounce authoritarianism.
“The ‘China Through the Ages’ incident was a sign that Li Rui and his peers’ dream would never come true,” Mr. Zhang said. “But I understand Li Rui: To deny the party would have meant denying his own life.”
Ian Johnson |
This isn’t how China wants to portray itself to the world. Instead, it wants to be seen as a modern country able to offer a new model for governing—the “China formula” (zhongguo fang’an). China’s political system might owe much to the Soviet Union, but it sees itself as much more than just a successor to that failed state.
This desire for normality extends to how one translates the name of the office that Xi can now hold for the rest of his life. The official translation is “president,” but in Chinese it’s zhuxi, or chairman. It sounds strange to speak of someone being “chairman of China”—it sounds so “Chairman Mao”—hence the official translation, “president.”
These terms matter domestically, too. For twenty-five years, the three titles—head of party, military, and state—have been united under one person. By dropping the term limits on the presidency, Xi can keep a grip on all three without having a head of state (like a king or queen) who only appears at ceremonial occasions. Such a system wouldn’t work in China. Here, more than in many other countries, ceremony is authority.
Television footage of the stately Xi and his stylish wife meeting and greeting foreign dignitaries is a major reason for his popularity; losing that would harm him politically.In hindsight, all this makes perfect sense, but I have to admit I was skeptical last autumn when some political analysts suggested that Xi might try to rule past a second term. One reason was that the Chinese political class has fought hard to institutionalize transfers of power. I wondered if Xi would want to risk alienating so many of his peers by taking such a step.
More in the NY Review of Books.Another risk is that this puts Xi in the crosshairs if his policies fail. Should the economy fail to make the transition to a more modern, technology-driven model, for example, it will be difficult for Xi to blame his premier, Li Keqiang, because Xi has so completely eclipsed Li in economic policy. Mao and Deng had proxies who took the fall for failed policies. Now, it’s Xi standing alone.
Ian Johnson |
“As one guy who told me, 'We used to think we were unhappy because we were poor. Now, we’re no longer poor, but we’re still unhappy,'” says Ian Johnson, a long time correspondent in China, most recently writing for The New York Times and the New York Review of Books, and author of the new book The Souls of China: The Return of Religion After Mao.
If it’s tempting to pull out the old saying "money can’t buy happiness," many Chinese are more interested these days in figuring out what can. And so, a search for meaning has intensified in recent decades, as the descendents of those who once revered Mao Zedong and the Communist Party, and Chinese emperors before that, now embrace new centers of meaning, and new communities that share their values...
“A lot of it is driven by this feeling that there are no shared values in Chinese society anymore,” says Johnson. “People constantly talk in social media –—and this is uncensored (by the Chinese government), it’s OK to talk about it — this lack of minimum moral standards in society, that anything goes, as long as you don’t get caught.”
Another driver, Johnson says, is a desire for community in a society that has rapidly urbanized, with rural Chinese moving to new cities, and old urban-dwellers losing their neighborhoods to demolition and construction of new developments.
The Communist Party officially recognizes five religions — Buddhism, Daoism, Protestantism, Catholicism and Islam, and tries to control each under the umbrella of the state, forbidding most ties with foreign centers of power, such as the Vatican. The party has long been wary of competing parallel power structures, including "house churches," gatherings of Protestant Chinese who seek to practice their faith outside of the strictures of Communist Party rules. Many such adherents still remember and respect Watchman Nee...
Turning to religion or spiritual practice is one way Chinese are now looking for meaning, but, as in the past in China, what starts with finding a new moral center, can lead to a yearning to shape new relationships and rules in society. China is still finding its moral compass and its direction, some 40 years after Mao’s death, and what started as a search for meaning may yet lead to more sweeping societal change. It’s a prospect that makes the Communist Party nervous, and keeps it vigilant.
“I think all religions have an over-arching idea of justice and righteousness, and heaven, ‘tian,’ that ‘s above all else,” Johnson says. “It helps create among people that it’s not the government that gives us rights and laws. It comes from something higher. And I think that’s the change that could come to China in the future.”
Victor Shih |
In the days after his elevation to “core” status, Mr. Xi has moved quickly to keep positioning his allies for promotion into the party’s top ranks next year, when nearly half the 25 members of the decision-making Politburo are to retire.
On Monday, Cai Qi, an official who served under Mr. Xi in the eastern province of Zhejiang, was appointed acting mayor of Beijing. Mr. Cai, who most recently served as a senior official on the National Security Commission founded by Mr. Xi, appears likely to become the city’s party chief — a more powerful post than mayor — after the current one retires in the next year.
Speaking after his appointment, Mr. Cai heaped praise on the Chinese president, telling officials in the capital that “establishing the core status” of Mr. Xi was the most important achievement of the party meeting last week. He added that China’s achievements since 2012 were the work of Mr. Xi, a “brilliant leader,” according to the official newspaper Beijing Daily.
Similar promotions are likely to come in the year ahead, said Victor Shih, a political scientist at the University of California, San Diego, who closely follows Chinese Communist Party personnel changes.
“Xi has repeatedly gone out of his way to place individuals with whom he had past ties in important positions, sometimes against party norms or convention,” he said. “Xi clearly wants his trusted followers in the key positions in the party, the military and in the internal security apparatus.”
More in the New York Times.That does not mean that all posts will be stacked with Mr. Xi’s longtime friends. The decision that elevated him to “core” also emphasized “democratic centralism” — giving all senior officials a say — and said they should come from the “five lakes and four seas,” meaning from varied backgrounds.
Victor Shih |
Despite quoting Deng Xiaoping, China's market-oriented reformer, in a brief passage about the importance of economic development, the Chinese leader did not delve into the economy. Instead, his lengthy address was larded with nationalism and soaring references to the blood and tears that the party had sacrificed for China through the socialist revolution.
Victor Shih, a political science professor at the University of California, San Diego, said the speech underscored the dyed-in-the-wool politics of the Xi administration compared to his technocrat predecessors who more often dressed up economic reforms in Marxist language.
"The longer President Xi has ruled, the more he has revealed his orthodox Marxist-Leninist perspective," Shih said. "There's nothing like the previous administrations, like Jiang Zemin, with an emphasis on modernizing or reinterpreting Marxism — that was very flexible."More in AP.
The sophistication of Chinese users in the use of digital communications technology has matured beyond the online petitions that marked the melamine poisoning disaster, just after the 2008 Beijing Olympics, when milk laced with a cousin of plastic was fatal to a dozen children in China and harmed scores more.More at Bill Dodson's weblog
This time really is different, with Weibo tweets and blogs and editors of online newspapers combining their efforts to make a concerted attack on the high-handedness and opacity with which the CPC has been operating for decades. Now, though, the “trust me I know what I’m doing and you’re just along for the ride” arrogance of the Party has worn thin as even the man on the street seems to be questioning whether China’s infrastructure development pace is too fast.
In China Inside Out: 10 Irreversible Trends Reshaping China and its Relationship with the World, Chapter 1, I write extensively about the use of the internet in China to flush out abuse of power in the government. This time, though, government censors seem to be on the side of the citizens. Chinese users are still criticizing, tweeting, blogging and investigating with abandon.
No one in China believes in communism anymore. The Communist Party has abandoned Communist ideology. A friend of mine joked that the Chinese government wears a Polo shirt and Nike shoes, but still has a communist hat. The Party is simply a ruling outfit that practices what seems to be quasi-capitalism...More in the Boston Review
[But] With or without its defining ideology, the Party has shown no sign of loosening control. Even the increased efforts to recruit members from private and foreign-owned companies don’t reflect outreach so much as assertion of power. Party organizations were traditionally strong in state-owned enterprises, and with the growing presence in China of private and foreign-owned firms, the Communist Party was concerned about losing support from young people. So it has sought out the best of them: the Party has been adamant about qualifications, such as academic achievements or career credentials.
Young people recognize that Party membership offers significant advantages, such as opportunities for career advancement, social status, and government connections. China: the Dragon’s Ascent, a 2003 History Channel documentary, provides some illustrative anecdotes. In it an ambitious young student at China’s highly regarded Fudan University said, “I really want to do something for the country. I want to join the Communist Party so that I can better serve my country.” Another student, who was planning to go overseas to study, said, “If I go abroad, I won’t join the party. But if I cannot go overseas, I may join the party.” Other students agreed with him that if he stayed in China, he should join the party and reap the benefits.