Weblog with daily updates of the news on a frugal, fair and beautiful China, from the perspective of internet entrepreneur, new media advisor and president of the China Speakers Bureau Fons Tuinstra
China expert Kaiser Kuo kicks off a wide-ranging debate on Huawei and describes how it developed from a rather obscure brand with no government support into the national champion it is today, at the Asia Society. Now it appeals to nationalistic feelings among consumers in China, but that trajectory was not so obvious at its humble start, he says.
Later, the debate focuses on whether Huawei can have its own “DeepSeek moment” in the semiconductor industry.
China expert Kaiser Kuo attended this year’s World Economic Forum in Davos and wrote up the three trends shaping China’s development for the Weforum. Including how China is managing multiple transitions, its role in the global industry, and the country’s latest breakthroughs in artificial intelligence.
Kaiser Kuo:
The electric vehicle sector emerged as a prime example of China’s evolving role in global industry. Pan Jian, co-chairman of Chinese EV battery giant CATL, emphasized the need for global collaboration: “It’s not going to be a one-country effort in terms of EVs. It’s going to be a global effort.” He highlighted China’s success in fostering a robust EV ecosystem through what he called a “perfect marriage between the public and private sectors,” while noting that software integration has been crucial to China’s EV success: “In China, we no longer call them EVs; we call them EIVs — where the ‘I’ stands for ‘intelligent.’ The ‘I’ is what truly makes the difference. Without the intelligence aspect, EV penetration in China would never have exceeded 30%.”
The international march forward of China’s EV producers profoundly influences the supply chains. China veteran Kaiser Kuo looks at the World Economic Forum in Davos, especially at CATL, the market leader for batteries in China, and a magnet for geopolitical tensions, he writes at the WEForum.
Kaiser Kuo:
China’s rise as a superpower in the electric vehicle (EV) industry has reshaped global supply chains, and at the centre of this transformation is Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. Ltd. (CATL). As the world’s largest EV battery maker, CATL has become a critical player in the clean energy transition – and a lightning rod for geopolitical tensions. Co-chairman and co-founder Pan Jian of CATL, speaking recently at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in Davos, underscored the global nature of the EV revolution: “It’s not going to be a one-country effort in terms of EVs. It’s going to be a global effort.”…
The road ahead for CATL is strewn with obstacles. The Trump administration’s tariffs on Chinese EVs and proposed bans on Chinese software – the very thing Pan credits for China’s edge in EVs – in US-sold vehicles are likely to complicate CATL’s operations. Furthermore, the Pentagon’s designation could deter US automakers from deepening partnerships with CATL, despite the company’s importance to their supply chains.
Yet CATL’s leadership remains confident. Pan’s optimism reflects a broader belief in the inevitability of EVs and the necessity of global collaboration. “It’s a massive cultural shift,” he said, referring to the transformation of the auto industry, “but it’s going to happen.”
As the EV revolution accelerates, CATL’s ability to navigate these geopolitical and market complexities will shape not only its future, but also the contours of the global energy transition. Its story is emblematic of a world grappling with the contradictions of competition, cooperation and the urgent need for sustainability.
China veteran Kaiser Kuo of the Sinica Podcast moderates a discussion on how the US-China tension have an profound impact on the war in the Ukraine and the position of Taiwan at the Ukrainian platform for Contemporary China.
The speakers: Da Wei, Director of Center for International Security and Strategy; Professor at School of Social Sciences, Tsinghua University; Dmytro Burtsev, Junior Fellow at A. Krymskyi Institute of Oriental Studies, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine; Emilian Kavalski, Professor at Centre for International Studies and Development, Jagiellonian University in Krakow; Yuan I, Research Fellow, Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taiwan.
US lawmakers have started debate on a law that would ban the successful TikTok app. Political analyst Kaiser Kuo dismisses the effort as misguided at best, he writes in the ChinaFile. “In a sense, the threat of TikTok is real: In this crisis of confidence, and in a state of moral panic that we’ll look back on red-faced a decade out, TikTok is causing us to inflict grievous self-harm.”
Kaiser Kuo:
The bill that got through Congress on Wednesday to effectively ban TikTok—let’s not pretend either that this bill isn’t specifically about TikTok, or that a forced divestiture isn’t tantamount to a ban—is the latest example of a classic pattern of American behavior: In a panicked attempt to preserve the American way of life, we undermine that very way of life. This time, we seem to be falling over one another to sacrifice our openness, a cornerstone of American strength, out of exaggerated fear that a social media app owned by a Chinese company could be our undoing. As usual, this whole episode says much more about us than it does about China. We have a terrible track record of making bad decisions while in the throes of a moral panic, from Prohibition to the Patriot Act. A closer analogy can be found in the Trump administration’s moves to restrict Chinese STEM students and researchers from coming and working in the U.S., and the subsequent China Initiative. Out of a fear that Chinese industrial espionage would confer an advantage on Beijing, we somehow decided that we were better off if all that prodigious Chinese STEM talent went back to China or just stayed there.
If we accept that we ought to take preemptive action against threats to national security, even if they are only latent and potential, any actions should address those potential threats in good faith. In this case, the threats are data harvested by social media falling into the hands of the Chinese, and social media being used by China to advance a hostile agenda. The bill now making its way to the Senate does not address either of these threats. Instead, it takes aim only at one relatively minor potential vector. Not only is the preponderance of valuable data on TikTok out in the open—the content itself, not the metadata—and would be there just the same irrespective of who owned the company, but Beijing can easily either buy valuable data from brokers, vacuum it up from other social media properties, or just acquire it the old fashioned way, through hacking.
That the motive behind this bill is not, in fact, data security is driven home by the refusal of legislators to accept ByteDance’s own proposal, Project Texas, which was devised in consultation with the Austin-based tech company Oracle and The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) and would see data localized and housed entirely on servers controlled by Oracle with oversight entirely by U.S. citizens vetted and approved by Oracle. Project Texas would make TikTok the most locked-down, secure social media property in the U.S., if not in the world. The notion that even under that plan, Beijing would still decide to squeeze ByteDance just to acquire data it could obtain far more easily, and in ways that wouldn’t seriously imperil the only Chinese social media company to have enjoyed any global success, is just risible.
And influence? If TikTok is a potent vector for Chinese propagandists, one has to ask: How’s that working out for you, Beijing? Across its years of popularity, American attitudes toward China have plummeted, not improved. If we’re looking for causation, it is clear enough that, if anything, it’s our low national opinion of China driving D.C.’s animus toward TikTok. In a sense, the threat of TikTok is real: In this crisis of confidence, and in a state of moral panic that we’ll look back on red-faced a decade out, TikTok is causing us to inflict grievous self-harm.
China veteran Ian Johnson published earlier this month China’s Underground Historians and their Battle for the Future, “Based on years of first-hand research in Xi Jinping’s China, Sparks challenges stereotypes of a China where the state has quashed all free thought, revealing instead a country engaged in one of humanity’s great struggles of memory against forgetting―a battle that will shape the China that emerges in the mid-21st century.”
In the China Project, Ian Johnson discusses his book with Kaiser Kuo.
The China Project:
Ian: Well, I think that we have to realize that this state, currently under Xi Jinping, as powerful as it is, it has not crushed all free thought. That there’s still people in China today who are availing themselves of basic digital technologies and just person-to-person contact to keep alive a different vision of China. I will be giving a talk in New York with my interlocutor Gal Beckerman who wrote a book called The Quiet Before. It basically talks about the slow burn process of how social movements take off. They don’t take off all right away. They take off with slow person-to-person contacts. I think this is something that you can see from this book, that there is this group, tens of thousands of people, this small collective memory of a different kind of China that could be, and that they’re still at it and they’re still active.
If we’re looking for interlocutors in China, and people are always like, “Who do we talk to? We can’t talk with the Communist Party.” These are the kind of people we could be talking to more. We could be inviting them. It stuns me that there’s not been a major retrospective at a big film festival of Hu Jie, of his films. I mean, he’d made three classic documentary films. He’s made it more, but three of them are just outstanding. These kinds of things, I think we should be more aware of them. This would also give people a different view of China. There are so many people in the West who see China as this monolith with just bad commies running the show. And while there may be some truth to that, it’s important to realize that there are other people out there too, and that they’re significant in number.
They’re not all just beleaguered victims about to be arrested right away. They have agency and they’re doing interesting stuff, and we should try to engage with them. Go over, visit them, bring our university, start up university exchanges more. Especially us going there. All those things are takeaways that I put in the conclusion. And because I am working at the Council on Foreign Relations, I have to have a little bit of a policy wonk takeaway thing. That’s in the conclusion of my book as some things that we could consider as implications of these stories.
China veteran Kaiser Kuo, co-founder of the Sinica Podcast and editor-at-large of the China Project, discusses the current state of the US-China relations, together with Susan Shirk, introducing her latest book, Overreach: How China Derailed Its Peaceful Rise at the Richard M. Krasno Distinguished Professorship at UNC-Chapel Hill, presided by Klaus Larres.
China veteran Kaiser Kuo discusses the US approach of China, and how it should change, at the Centre of East Asian Studies at the University of Wisconsin.
Kaiser Kuo is a speaker at the China Speakers Bureau. Do you need him at your meeting or conference? Do get in touch or fill in our speakers’ request form.
Are you looking for more strategic experts at the China Speakers Bureau? Do check out this list.
China watcher Kaiser Kuo tries to make sense out of China, in a world where polarized views on the second economy in the world often lead to exchanges of opinion and less analysis of facts, he told at the end of 2021 at the Europa Forum in Luzern, Switzerland.
China watcher Kaiser Kuo describes at the Varn Vlog how US-China relations went downhill since the 2008 financial crisis, and how that did not improve after President Joe Biden took over from Donald Trump. Also: how the Red Deal in China is changing domestic relations in China.
Rocker and political analyst Kaiser Kuo looks at how China – often wrongly – is perceived in the West in an interview with Australian broadcaster ABC. While the country has gone in less than a generation through a massive upgrade of its hardware, the software is often lagging behind, he says.
China veteran Kaiser Kuo discusses the relations between the US and China, and here focuses on the splintering of the internet, at a wide-ranging interview at the Wire China. “I also think we need to recognize that our worries are more about us than they are about China. We have in this country a real problem with surveillance capitalism, as it’s been called,” says Kaiser Kuo.
Wire China:
Given that first narrative switch you described — the now-accepted idea that technology has not led to a more open political system in China — many people talk about the splintering of the global internet. Do you think a splintering is inevitable?
To some extent, we have to recognize that there has already been a splintering when it comes to a lot of popular services on the internet. A lot of that owes to China’s very severe regime of internet censorship. But I worry about the United States accepting this as a norm and simply going along with it and imposing these same types of objectionable ideas that run so counter to our core values. I think the impact of it is not so much economic as it is moral, and it would be a betrayal of our values to embrace this. I think we should all be working to have a more open internet rather than acquiescing, and proactively helping it toward this other outcome — a splintered, fragmented, and decoupled internet.
I also think we need to recognize that our worries are more about us than they are about China. We have in this country a real problem with surveillance capitalism, as it’s been called. Our concerns over Chinese tech have been amplified in large measures by our worries about how American tech companies are treating our data, and following our every click online and targeting us with greater and greater precision.
Let me put it this way: the Trump administration and its moves against companies like Tencent’s WeChat and Bytedance’s TikTok were clearly never about national security. They were never about data privacy. We’ve seen that now. It’s clear, at least to me, that they were about this broader project of suppressing China’s technology prowess, and were very much of a piece with what we’ve done with Huawei. There are important differences between them, of course. And I think from a national security point of view, you could certainly make a stronger case for Huawei being of concern. But when you look at WeChat, which has users only in the single digit millions in the United States, almost all of them are either Americans with strong connections to China or are Chinese nationals or ethnic Chinese. That national security case is very weak. With TikTok, it’s almost laughable.
The WeChat and TikTok ban is a good example of how many American lawmakers view the U.S.-China tech competition as a zero-sum game. Are there areas where you could imagine productive cooperation in technology between the two countries?
I think if you look back over the last 30 years, cooperation in technology has been fantastically fruitful. Let’s start with immigration policy. The Trump administration is going after H-1B visas and trying to restrict the ability of ethnically Chinese scientists, researchers or technologists to participate in research in the United States. All these things are shooting ourselves in the foot and surrendering, or deliberately blowing up, what is probably the single greatest advantage that this country has had in technology. You only have to look at the great companies of Silicon Valley, Seattle, or Boston, and look at a list of the surnames to realize what kind of contribution is being made by people who the Trump administration’s Department of Justice is targeting through its China initiative, that Homeland Security is trying to prevent from entering this country, and that the Trump administration is attempting to demonize. Part of productive technology cooperation would be stopping this utterly feckless policy and reversing it. We can do that and still protect American national security interests if we put a little more trust into the natural immune system of an open society.
China watcher Kaiser Kuo discusses Western narratives on China’s rise. Technology did not beat authoritarian regimes, he explains, just as other Western views on China were profoundly wrong. The Arab Spring uprising was the first sign technology did not bring repression down, but not the last one, he argues.
My wife and I returned to the States in 2016. We were very happy in Beijing. It was simply so our kids could get an American education. But it’s been sheer agony to watch helplessly as
I actually feel ripped apart, and not out of attraction to both sides but out of profound disappointment with both countries. Dialogue is still possible, and understanding one another’s perspectives is more urgent than ever. So as dark as things are, I’m still fighting the good fight, and platforms like SupChina and Sinica are more important than ever.
China watcher Kaiser Kuo opens a panel on innovation in China at the (pre-corona) AMR Festival 2019 discussing how the West had flipping narratives on how the technology works in an authoritarian climate. And both say more about the China observers in the West than China itself, Kaiser argues.
Donald Trump's plan to ban Tiktok from the US is straight-up Sinophobia, says former Baidu communications director Kaiser Kuoto Slate. Most successful apps in China will not make a decent following among consumers in the rest of the world, he argues, just because they are too much adjusted to China's internet rules and customs, he adds.
Slate:
Kaiser Kuo, a Chinese American tech journalist and podcaster, and former spokesperson for the Chinese search engine Baidu, agrees that TikTok’s data collection has been aggressive but feels surveillance fears are overblown. “We have not seen any evidence so far that they’ve done anything nefarious. This is about our deeply emotional response to China. It’s straight-up Sinophobia,” he said in an interview prior to Trump’s ban threat. “If TikTok, which is just pure greasy kids’ stuff, is drawing so much fire, it’s hard to believe that anything wouldn’t.”
It’s also not clear that China really wants to develop globally successful consumer tech products. Kuo notes that TikTok’s success is something of an anomaly, since “the really successful apps in China, the very things that made them successful would hinder them from success in other markets.” Baidu, for instance, may be an excellent search engine but its compliance with Chinese censorship laws makes it difficult to export.
The messaging service WeChat is an all-in-one swiss army knife app for its Chinese users, facilitating everything from payment to ridesharing to food ordering. Given its ubiquity, it’s also a powerful tool for surveillance and censorship, which is why the international edition is so pared down that it’s essentially a WhatsApp knock-off.
TikTok’s domestic Chinese counterpart, Douyin, also boasts some micropayment and search features—in addition to censorship compliance—that are absent from the global version.
China veteran Kaiser Kuo discusses the future of relations between China and the US, as disaster is luring, while cooperation is needed more than ever considering the problems of the coronavirus and climate change. On racism in the US, at the Oxford Political Review. Kaiser Kuo is a speaker at the China Speakers Bureau. Do you need him at your meeting or conference? Do get in touch or fill in our speakers' request form. Are you looking for more political experts on the China Speakers Bureau? Do check out this list.
Veteran China watcher Kaiser Kuo discusses at the Wilson Center what China wants. Does it want to topple global order, and trying to impose change on the outside world? A wide-ranging discussion, also including Jiayang Fan. Is it exporting its ideology of just pragmatic?
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