Weblog with daily updates of the news on a frugal, fair and beautiful China, from the perspective of internet entrepreneur, new media advisor and president of the China Speakers Bureau Fons Tuinstra
Why is China calling itself a democracy when it is not according to most definitions? China scholar Ian Johnson, a fellow at the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin, discusses this and other political issues at the Council on Foreign Relations. In the same way, it is not a dictatorship where Xi Jinping can decide on all issues in the country, he says.
What happened to former foreign minister Qin Gang one year ago is still unclear. After a stellar career, the sudden disappearance of Qin triggered a slew of rumors, including an extramarital affair with a British spy, an affair with Xi Jinping’s daughter, and more speculations. Political analyst Victor Shih tells Politico that China’s leadership is still unsure of how to handle this case.
Politico:
If Qin can prove that he was unaware of his alleged mistress’ rumored spy ties “he may have a case for leniency,” said Victor Shih, an expert in Chinese elite politics and the Ho Miu Lam chair in China and Pacific Relations at UC San Diego’s School of Global Policy and Strategy. But the official silence on Qin’s status likely reflects indecision among China’s senior leadership about how to close his case, Shih said.
US lawmakers have started debate on a law that would ban the successful TikTok app. Political analyst Kaiser Kuo dismisses the effort as misguided at best, he writes in the ChinaFile. “In a sense, the threat of TikTok is real: In this crisis of confidence, and in a state of moral panic that we’ll look back on red-faced a decade out, TikTok is causing us to inflict grievous self-harm.”
Kaiser Kuo:
The bill that got through Congress on Wednesday to effectively ban TikTok—let’s not pretend either that this bill isn’t specifically about TikTok, or that a forced divestiture isn’t tantamount to a ban—is the latest example of a classic pattern of American behavior: In a panicked attempt to preserve the American way of life, we undermine that very way of life. This time, we seem to be falling over one another to sacrifice our openness, a cornerstone of American strength, out of exaggerated fear that a social media app owned by a Chinese company could be our undoing. As usual, this whole episode says much more about us than it does about China. We have a terrible track record of making bad decisions while in the throes of a moral panic, from Prohibition to the Patriot Act. A closer analogy can be found in the Trump administration’s moves to restrict Chinese STEM students and researchers from coming and working in the U.S., and the subsequent China Initiative. Out of a fear that Chinese industrial espionage would confer an advantage on Beijing, we somehow decided that we were better off if all that prodigious Chinese STEM talent went back to China or just stayed there.
If we accept that we ought to take preemptive action against threats to national security, even if they are only latent and potential, any actions should address those potential threats in good faith. In this case, the threats are data harvested by social media falling into the hands of the Chinese, and social media being used by China to advance a hostile agenda. The bill now making its way to the Senate does not address either of these threats. Instead, it takes aim only at one relatively minor potential vector. Not only is the preponderance of valuable data on TikTok out in the open—the content itself, not the metadata—and would be there just the same irrespective of who owned the company, but Beijing can easily either buy valuable data from brokers, vacuum it up from other social media properties, or just acquire it the old fashioned way, through hacking.
That the motive behind this bill is not, in fact, data security is driven home by the refusal of legislators to accept ByteDance’s own proposal, Project Texas, which was devised in consultation with the Austin-based tech company Oracle and The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) and would see data localized and housed entirely on servers controlled by Oracle with oversight entirely by U.S. citizens vetted and approved by Oracle. Project Texas would make TikTok the most locked-down, secure social media property in the U.S., if not in the world. The notion that even under that plan, Beijing would still decide to squeeze ByteDance just to acquire data it could obtain far more easily, and in ways that wouldn’t seriously imperil the only Chinese social media company to have enjoyed any global success, is just risible.
And influence? If TikTok is a potent vector for Chinese propagandists, one has to ask: How’s that working out for you, Beijing? Across its years of popularity, American attitudes toward China have plummeted, not improved. If we’re looking for causation, it is clear enough that, if anything, it’s our low national opinion of China driving D.C.’s animus toward TikTok. In a sense, the threat of TikTok is real: In this crisis of confidence, and in a state of moral panic that we’ll look back on red-faced a decade out, TikTok is causing us to inflict grievous self-harm.
Inequality has been one of China’s central problems, writes author and journalist Zhang Lijia in the South China Morning Post. There is no shortage of efforts to fix it, she argues, and while China has dealt with poverty successfully, getting to common prosperity, as it is called, seems much harder to achieve.
Zhang Lijia:
Last month, Panzhihua, a city in western China’s Sichuan province, announced this would be its “breakthrough” year in establishing itself as a common prosperity pilot zone. It is following the example of Zhejiang province in the east, another such pilot zone which was set up in 2021. The idea is to push for a high-quality development that focuses on closing the economic gap between regions, between urban and rural areas, and in income.
This is encouraging news, but will such efforts work? Will there be more pilot zones like these? Will China really achieve common prosperity, or is it mainly a political slogan? The truth is still emerging.
The concept of common prosperity is not new. It first appeared in 1953 during the Mao era as he pushed China towards socialist collectivisation.
Around 1979, shortly after paramount leader Deng Xiaoping had introduced economic reforms and opening up, he declared that China’s path to common prosperity would be to let some people and regions get rich first to help the rest. The term gained new significance in 2021 when President Xi Jinping vigorously promoted it as a way to guard against economic and political polarisation.
Since 1978, some people and regions have indeed become rich. China has transformed from one of the world’s poorest countries to its second-largest economy, and from a relatively equal society to one of the most unequal in the world.
The structural flaws inherent in China’s political system – from state-controlled capitalism to corruption – have all contributed to the problem. The top 10 per cent income share rose from 27 per cent in 1978 to 41 per cent in 2015, approaching levels seen in the United States, according to research by economist Thomas Piketty and his colleagues.
Xi clearly realises the risk of such income and wealth disparities, which could stifle growth and erode confidence in the leadership. Defining common prosperity is complicated as it has many implications and associated aspirations. In one sense, China’s pursuit of common prosperity seeks to build up the middle class so it can become more of an engine of consumption.
China expert Victor Shih, Director of the 21st Century China Center at the University of California San Diego School of Global Policy and Strategy, discusses the current state of US-China relations with Bill Gertz of the Washington Post, covering questions like, “Is China an existential threat or a competitor?” and “Is China trying to replace the US as hegemon?” at PNYX.
Victor Shih is a speaker at the China Speakers Bureau. Do you need him at your meeting or conference? Do get in touch or fill in our speakers’ request form.
The draft law banning clothes deemed offensive to national feelings in China has triggered much debate. Author and journalist Zhang Lijia dives and looks back at the campaigns from her youth at the Nanjing rocket factory, and more recent incidents, for the South China Morning Post.
Zhang Lijia:
Last summer, a young woman doing a photo shoot in Suzhou was detained by the police simply because she was wearing a kimono. Last month, people wearing shirts with rainbows, seen as a pro-LGBTQ symbol, were not allowed to enter a concert in Beijing.
The Chinese authorities have always liked to behave like a parent, offering citizens all sorts of advice on matters minor and major. In 2019, they issued “morality guidelines” which directed people to be polite, travel with a lower carbon footprint and have “faith” in the Communist Party.
But the latest proposed law goes a bit too far. Some have speculated that kimono wearers are likely to be the target. Anti-Japan sentiment has long run high in China because of imperial Japan’s war atrocities, such as the massacre at Nanjing. After police detained the kimono-clad woman in Suzhou last year, netizens debated whether donning a kimono was unpatriotic.The debate has flared up again. If wearing a kimono went against the proposed law, one netizen wondered, what about Western-style clothing? Another responded by noting that Western-style clothing is a symbol of Western culture and can be seen as a symbol of Western invaders, so why wouldn’t wearing Western-style clothing constitute hurting national feelings?
The problem is that the draft law is vague. The proposed change does not specify the kinds of clothing that would constitute a violation…
An incident in Wuhan has only reinforced people’s concerns. About a week ago, video footage emerged of a group of young people in hanfu at Panlongcheng National Archaeological Site Park, a public park, who were repeatedly told to leave by security guards who thought they were in kimono – even though they explained they were in Tang dynasty costume.
I am delighted to see the outpouring of criticism over the contentious draft amendment. Hopefully, if opposing voices are loud enough, the authorities will listen and rethink going ahead with it. Personal freedom should be respected.
China’s rules are building a divide with the rest of the world, similar to the Berlin wall Russia started to build last century, says China veteran Ian Johnson in news.com.au. “Speech is more restricted than ever. Community activities and social groups are strictly regulated and monitored by the authorities,” he explained.
News.com.au:
“China’s rulers seem to be building and perfecting their own 21st-century version of the Berlin Wall,” said Council on Foreign Relations senior fellow Ian Johnson.
“Using the tools of the digital age, Xi transformed China’s wall from an ad hoc assembly of rules and regulations into a sleek, powerful apparatus.
“In doing so, however, it may instead be repeating the mistakes of its Eastern bloc predecessors in the middle decades of the Cold War.”…
The CFR’s Johnson argues China’s “economic problems are part of a broader process of political ossification and ideological hardening”.
“Speech is more restricted than ever. Community activities and social groups are strictly regulated and monitored by the authorities,” he explained.
“And for foreigners, the arbitrary detention of businesspeople and raids on foreign consulting firms have – for the first time in decades – added a sense of risk to doing business in the country.”…
The end result, added Johnson, is Xi’s own version of Nikita Khruschev’s Berlin Wall, which was put up in 1961 to isolate the Soviet Union from the West.
“Even though he had recently won an unprecedented third term as party general secretary and president and seemed set to rule for life, public mistrust was higher than at any previous point in his decade in power,” said Council on Foreign Relations senior fellow Ian Johnson.
“But none of that happened … Beijing has clung to a strategy of accelerating government intervention in Chinese life.”
“The deeper effects of this walling-off are unlikely to be felt overnight,” said Johnson.
Creative, well-educated and dynamic people still fill China’s universities, corporations and bureaucracy. But they’ve lost the incentive to be such.
“To visit China today is to enter a parallel universe of apps and websites that control access to daily life,” Johnson added.
“For outsiders, ordering a cab, buying a train ticket, and purchasing almost any goods requires a Chinese mobile phone, Chinese apps, and often a Chinese credit card.
“On one level, these hindrances are trivial, but they are also symptomatic of a government that seems almost unaware of the extent to which its ever more expansive centralisation is closing the country off from the outside world.”
US restrictions on purchasing chips from China are hurting US semiconductor firms, says political analyst Victor Shih in an interview with the state news agency Xinhua. Not every chip sold by U.S. companies is cutting edge or has national security relevance. In those cases, the U.S. government should show some flexibility,” said Shih
Xinhua:
The Biden administration’s curbs on chip sales to China likely have impeded revenue growth of U.S. chips companies to some extent, a U.S. expert has said.
“The U.S. chips companies, like any companies, are very interested in expanding market share, and selling to the China market is very important since China is now the biggest consumer of chips in the world,” Victor Shih, associate professor of political science who also heads the 21st Century China Center at the School of Global Policy and Strategy with the University of California San Diego, told Xinhua in a recent interview…
On July 25, the Semiconductor Industry Association and Oxford Economics released a joint report stating that approximately 67,000 positions in the U.S. semiconductor industry, including roles for technicians, computer scientists and engineers, are projected to remain vacant by 2030.
Besides the shortfall of skilled workforce, the high cost is another hurdle for the industry. “The higher cost basis in the U.S. will not change in the short run. In the medium term, it remains unclear whether the U.S. can set up an apprenticeship program to train sufficient numbers of technicians for semiconductor fabs,” said Shih.
The Semiconductor Industry Association revealed that the 10-year total cost of ownership of a new lab in the United States is 30-50 percent higher than in East Asian economies…
If the restrictions continue, “the segmentation of the global semi market potentially will create very capable Chinese chips competitors to U.S. companies since Chinese buyers now have no choice but to buy from domestic chips makers, giving them a large captive market,” Shih said.
“A balance between national security concerns and commercial concerns is possible. Not every chip sold by U.S. companies is cutting edge or has national security relevance. In those cases, the U.S. government should show some flexibility,” said Shih.
Many observers have been pessimistic about China’s recent leadership changes and the centralization under Xi Jinping. Still, renowned economist Arthur Kroeber sees a significant upside, at least for the short term. Also, what is Xi Jinping’s vision for the country’s economic development?
Political analyst Victor Shih looks at the seachange that has taken place in China since Xi Jin Ping took charge. Especially 2015 was the transition year, where Xi and the party even sidelined the previously more powerful state council, he tells at the China Inside Out meeting at the Asia Society in New York, together with his colleagues from the University of California San Diego’s 21st Century China Center (21CCC).
China veteran Kaiser Kuo discusses the US approach of China, and how it should change, at the Centre of East Asian Studies at the University of Wisconsin.
Kaiser Kuo is a speaker at the China Speakers Bureau. Do you need him at your meeting or conference? Do get in touch or fill in our speakers’ request form.
Are you looking for more strategic experts at the China Speakers Bureau? Do check out this list.
Many analysts took a negative view of Xi Jinping’s more centralized grip on China’s policies, but leading economist Arthur Kroeber looks at it differently, at least in the short run. Major problems like the zero-covid approach and the downturn of property have already benefited from Xi’s more coherent approach, Kroeber says at the Starr forum at MIT.
China analyst Victor Shih, author of Coalitions of the Weak, discusses with Bill Bishop and Cindy Yu at China Whispers on how the move from collective leadership to a centralized power might change policies in China after the 20th Communist Party Conference including the current line-up of the leadership, zero-covid and Taiwan.
With more domestic power in the hands of Xi Jinping, many observers expect a more stable China. China analyst Ian Johnson diverts from that line and expects the current stability is a rather superficial one, he tells NBC.
NBC:
“Our trend, our goals, our path — all are certain,” [Xi] said.
But Johnson said China under Xi has a “superficial stability.”
“The system he’s set up seems somewhat brittle, especially since it flies in the face of how most countries have gotten prosperous and wealthy and how to make friends in the world,” he said.
Xi has also made himself vulnerable by identifying himself so closely with key policies like “zero-Covid,” which he says is necessary to save lives but has caused growing public frustration and economic costs.
“He has less ability to jettison somebody, especially now that he’s surrounded by his team entirely,” Johnson said. “If he gets rid of somebody, that’s one of his allies he’s getting rid of.”
“Our trend, our goals, our path — all are certain,” he said.
But Johnson said China under Xi has a “superficial stability.”
“The system he’s set up seems somewhat brittle, especially since it flies in the face of how most countries have gotten prosperous and wealthy and how to make friends in the world,” he said.
Xi has also made himself vulnerable by identifying himself so closely with key policies like “zero-Covid,” which he says is necessary to save lives but has caused growing public frustration and economic costs.
“He has less ability to jettison somebody, especially now that he’s surrounded by his team entirely,” Johnson said. “If he gets rid of somebody, that’s one of his allies he’s getting rid of.”
The nomination of Li Qiang as the number two of China’s Communist Party was one of few surprises at the 20th CCP conference last week, says political analyst Victor Shih at CNN. Li Qiang, Shanghai’s party chief, was responsible for the city’s much-discussed two-month corona lock-down.
CNN:
While the lineup revealed Sunday is the top tier of the Communist Party, those selected will then go on to fill top government positions, as appointments are made in the coming months ahead of a key meeting of the country’s rubber-stamp legislature in March.
The new lineup means Xi will also gain greater control over all aspects of the Chinese state, including the economy, which is traditionally the domain of the premier, who heads its State Council.
That position is now expected to be placed in the hands of Shanghai party chief Li Qiang, a long time Xi loyalist who has been appointed to the number-two rolein the party, despite the backlash that followed a chaotic two-month Covid-19 lockdown in Shanghai earlier this year.
CNN:
Li’s appointment is one of several “norm-busting” elements of this year’s leadership reshuffle, according to Victor Shih, an expert on elite Chinese politics at the University of California San Diego, who noted that Li’s appointment will place a leader without any State Council experience at the head of that body — something not seen in decades.
“The Chinese economy and the State Council itself are so much more complex today compared to the 1980s. Not having that experience is going to at least initially make the job of running China’s state machinery that much more challenging,” said Shih, the author of “Coalitions of the Weak,” a book about elite politics in China over recent decades.
Meanwhile, the concentration of power “introduces a certain unhealthy dynamic in policymaking in that the people who are close to him are those who, over the years, have honed the skills of always agreeing and supporting Xi Jinping’s opinion,” he said.
Other new members include Cai, 66, party boss of Beijing and one of Xi’s most-trusted confidants; Li Xi, 66, current party chief of China’s southern economic engine Guangdong province and trusted Xi ally, who is expected to oversee the anti-corruption organization; and Ding, 60, Xi’s chief of staff and close aide.
